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GENERIC TRADEMARKS, THE FTC AND THE LANHAM
ACT: COVERING THE MARKET WITH FORMICA
DAVID E. SmPLEY*
A trademark may be "any word, name, symbol or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or mer-
chant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manu-
factured or sold by others."' The primary function of trademarks is
to identify the origin of a product, 2 thereby ensuring that the pur-
chaser of branded merchandise receives goods of consistent quality.3
Early case law recognized that trademark protection developed es-
sentially to reward successful business enterprises by preventing the
venture's goodwill from being pirated by manufacturers of similar
goods.4 Thus, trademark law serves generally as a safeguard that the
goods of one manufacturer will not be sold as another's merchan-
dise, that the purchasers of products will not be deceived regarding
the item's origin of manufacture, and that economic competition
will be fostered through the protection of a business' goodwill.5
* B.A., Oberlin College; J.D., University of Chicago. Assistant Professor of Law, University
of South Carolina.
1. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). Lanham Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970)
provides that "[flor the purposes of registration on the supplemental register, a mark may
consist of any trademark, symbol, label, package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan,
phrase, surname, geographical name, numeral, or device or any combination of any of the
foregoing. . ....
2. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1915); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80
U.S. 311, 323 (1871); cf. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (to
establish a trade name, the petitioner "must show that the primary significance of the term
. ..is not the product but the producer").
3. Weigel, Generic Names Versus Trademarks, 52 TRADEMARK REP. 768, 771 (1962).
4. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1915); see Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 315 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and affl'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
See generally Greenbaum, Trademarks Attacked, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 443, 449-50 (1968).
5. See generally Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in
the Market Place, 64 TRMaVMARK REP. 75 (1974); Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly
Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REv. 967, 970-71 (1952); Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Func-
tion of Trade-Marks, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 175-76 (1949).
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Not all designations qualify for protection by the courts as trade-
marks or for registration in the Patent and Trademark Office.' Var-
ious words have been denied protection because they were not dis-
tinctive7 or because they did not distinguish one firm's products
from those of other firms.8 Additionally, generic names, common
descriptive terms which denote only the name of a particular genus
or class of things or a member of such a class, categorically are
denied legal protection because they are commonly descriptive
rather than distinctive.9 They may be common dictionary terms or
former trademarks, such as aspirin, cellophane, shredded wheat, yo-
yo, escalator, and linoleum, which have been accepted as common
names for such products.'0
Because generic words are a nondistinctive identification of the
product itself rather than an indication of its origin of manufacture,
they represent the conceptual antithesis of a properly cognizable
trademark. Several consequences follow from attributing generic-
ness to a particular word. Such a characterization precludes federal
6. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[a] term for which trademark
protection is claimed will fit somewhere in the spectrum which ranges through (1) generic or
common descriptive and (2) merely descriptive to (3) suggestive and (4) arbitrary or fanciful."
Without deciding the precise issue of which end of the spectrum is entitled to the most
protection, the court of appeals suggested that: "[a]n arbitrary or fanciful term enjoys the
same full protection as a suggestive term but is far enough removed from the merely descrip-
tive not to be vulnerable to possible attack as being merely descriptive rather than sugges-
tive." Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, classified these
terms in an ascending order that roughly reflected "their eligibility to trademark status and
the degree of protection accorded" to each class: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive,
and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9
(2d Cir. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 634 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968) (citing 3 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPMrrIoN AND TRADE-
MARKS § 69 (2d ed. 1950) [rev. 3 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETMON TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 69 (3d ed. 1967)]).
8. For an extensive listing of words denied trademark protection due to the possibility of
confusing them with an existing trademark, see 3 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPMTON TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 82.1 (3d ed. 1967).
9. 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECrION AND PRACTIcE § 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-2.1, 2-7 to 2-11
(1977). Sections 14(c) and 15(4) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(c), 1065(4) (1970), do
not refer specifically to the term "generic names"; however, impliedly, "common descriptive
name" is synonymous.
10. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-3, 2-7 to 2-11 (1977); see Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). See also cases cited in note 14
infra.
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trademark registration*," prevents a federal trademark registration
from becoming incontestable, 2 and is a ground- for cancelling a fed-
eral registration at any time. 3 Moreover, the genericness of a term
is a defense to a trademark infringement action.14
Underlying the absence of a legally protectable right to use a
generic name is the notion that generic marks distort consumer
preferences and depress competition by indirectly restricting the
market for the products of competitors who are unable to use the
generic name to describe their products. 5 Thus, if the owner of a
genetic mark is allowed to monopolize the use of the word, his com-
petitors are deprived of the right to dispose of a similar product
through the use of the only description by which the product may
be recognized by consumers. 6
Four ways generally are available to raise the issue whether a
trademark registered with the Patent and Trademark Office has
become generic. First, in trademark infringement litigation between
private firms, the defendant may allege the genericness of the trade-
11. Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1970), precludes "merely
descriptive" designations from registration on the principal register but does not refer specifi-
cally to the term "generic names." Accordingly, the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re G.D. Searle & Co., 360 F.2d 650, 653 (C.C.P.A. 1966), noted that the
term, "common descriptive name," found in § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064, expressed the long-
recognized principle in trademark law which bars generic name registration.
12. Lanham Act § 15(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1970).
13. Id. § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1970).
14. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (the term "Shredded
Wheat" is too generic to confer an exclusive right of use); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (the word "light"
and its phonetic equivalent "lite" as too generic for exclusive appropriation as trademark);
Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965) (the term "yo-
yo" is too generic to acquire exclusive right of use); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("thermos" devolved to the public domain, thereby
losing its right to exclusive use protection). See also DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods.
Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waxed
Prods. Co., 299 U.S. 601 (1936) (cellophane); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (aspirin); Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (1950)
(escalator).
15. See note 73 infra & accompanying text.
16. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The exclusive right
of use by the trademark owner "must give way to a competitor if that is the only way in which
the competitor can get into the market, or adequately describe his goods." 17 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 112, 125 (1948); cf. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (competitor
only obligated to identify its own product clearly); Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods.
Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) (infringement suit is based on defendant's wrong in misleading
customers).
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mark as a defense." Second, genericness may be raised affirmatively
in a declaratory judgment action." Third, section 14 of the Lanham
Act 9 provides that any person who believes that he is damaged by
the registration of a mark on the ground that it has become generic
may file a petition with the Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks to cancel the registration of the mark. Moreover, this section
of the Act also authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
institute cancellation proceedings on this ground.2" The FTC, how-
ever, never petitioned to cancel a trademark solely on the ground
of genericness until May 31, 1978, when by a unanimous vote of the
Commission a petition was filed with the Patent and Trademark
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel For-
17. See note 14 supra.
18. See Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 314 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963), for an example of an
action brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (Supp. 1978).
See also 1 J. GIsON, supra note 9, § 8.03[2].
19. Section 14 of the LanhamtAct provides in pertinent part:
A verified petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied
upon, may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed by any person who
believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark on the
principal register established by this chapter ....
(c) at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descriptive
name of an article or has been abandoned, or its registration was obtained
fraudulently or contrary to the provisions . . . of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of
section 1052 of this title for a registration hereunder, [prohibiting registration
of marks which inter alia consist of immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter,
of flags or coats of arms of any nation, state or municipality, or of the unauthor-
ized use of names, portraits or signatures] . . . of if the registered mark is being
used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source
of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used ...
Provided, That the Federal Trade Commission may apply to cancel on the
grounds specified in [subsection] (c) . . . of this section any mark registered
on the principal register established by this chapter, and the prescribed fee shall
not be required.
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
Section 14 of the Act does not refer explicitly to the cancellation of the registration of
"generic" marks. Instead, the Act provides that a cancellation petition may be filed if the
registered mark becomes the "common descriptive name" of a product or if the mark has been
"abandoned." The former term presumably is synonymous with the term "generic." Further-
more, a mark is deemed to be abandoned "[w]hen any course of conduct of the registrant,
including acts of omission as well as commisson, causes the mark to lose its significance as
an indication of origin." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
20. Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970). See generally Remarks of Commissioner
Paul Rand Dixon, 100th Annual Meeting, United States Trademark Association, at 10 (May
11, 1978), reprinted in 68 TRADmAz REP. 463 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dixon, Remarks].
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mica Corporation's FORMICA trademark on the ground that it had
become generic. 21
This article focuses on the FTC's authority under section 14 of the
Lanham Act to petition for the cancellation of a trademark on the
ground that the mark has become "the common descriptive name
of an article or substance" 22 and, thus, generic. The FTC's recent
decision to challenge Formica Corporation's FORMICA trademark
manifests a shift in agency policy which is highly inappropriate and
which could have damaging effects on consumers and industry.
Competition and the public interest would be better served if the
FTC did not exercise this discretionary2 power, leaving the issue of
21. FTC v. Formica Corp., 382 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-1 to A-3 (June 8,1978).
Rudolf Callmann, a leading authority on trademark law, notes that "[i]t is rather odd to
find the Federal Trade Commission in the role of a petitioner before the forum of another
governmental agency, the Patent Office." 4 R. CALLmAN, supra note 8, § 94.8. Additionally,
Callmann states that "it should be remembered, the Commission is still a governmental
agency, owing its existence to its enabling act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and, once
again, can initiate such cancellation proceeding only if the public interest so requires." Id.
To date, there have been several procedural skirmishes concerning the FTC-Formica pro-
ceeding. American Cyanamid Corporition (Formica Corporation's parent) cancelled its 1963
Lanham Act registration in response to rumors about the FTC's plan to seek cancellation of
the FORMICA trademark, but it retained its registration for FORMICA that had been ob-
tained under the Trademark Act of 1905. See 371 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-5
(March 23, 1978); 379 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-2 (May 18, 1978). This action
apparently was based on several decisions by the Commissioner of Patents which cast doubt
on the FTC's right to challenge trademarks registered only under the 1905 Act. In May 1978,
the FTC filed its petition with the TrAB for cancellation and thereby indicated its belief that
it could use § 14 of the Lanham Act to cancel a mark registered under the 1905 Act. 382 PAT.,
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-1 (June 8, 1978). Formica Corporation then moved to dismiss
the FTC's petition, arguing that the Commission lacked statutory authority to bring the
cancellation proceeding. The FTC filed an opposition brief, arguing that the re-publication
of the 1905 registration under § 12(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(c), rendered the
mark subject to cancellation as if it were a pure Lanham Act registration. See 397 PAT., T.M.
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-4 (Sept. 28, 1978). The TIAB agreed with the FTC regarding the
effect of re-publication and denied Formica Corporation's motion to dismiss. FTC v. Formica
Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182 (T.T.A.B. 1978). The company then asked the Court of
Custom and Patent Appeals to grant writs of mandamus and prohibition that would compel
the TTAB to vacate its decision and to dismiss the FTC's cancellation proceeding. The FTC,
in turn, moved to dismiss the mandamus petition. The CCPA denied the petition for manda-
mus and thus refused to interfere with the FTC's efforts to cancel the FORMICA trademark.
Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 414 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-1 (Feb. 1, 1979). See Ball,
Government Versus Trademarks: Today-Pharmaceuticals, Realemon and Formica-
Tomorrow?, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 471 (1978), for an interesting analysis of the FTC's pro-
ceeding against the FORMICA trademark as part of a continuing and intensifying attack on
the entire trademark system by the government.
22. Lanham Act 99 14(c) and 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c),(e) (1970).
23. Section 14 commits the exercise of this power to petition for cancellation to agency
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whether a trademark should be cancelled as generic to be raised and
argued in disputes between private firms. 4 If in some instances the
continued use of a generic trademark results in demonstrable con-
sumer deception or competitive unfairness and no private firm is
interested in litigating the issue, the FTC's power under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act" to prevent unfair or decep-
tive business practices provides a sufficient and more appropriate
administrative remedy.
GENERICNESS: CAUSES, EVIDENCE AND THE
BURDEN OF PROOF
The more attractive and successful a trademark, the more desir-
ous competitors will be to convert the mark from a legally protected
symbol identifying the origin of the product to one which represents
a generic designation of the product itself, thereby rendering the
formerly exclusive mark available for all to use. Additionally, after
a trademark has entered the marketplace and a strong association
is established between the mark and the product, the owner of the
validly protectible mark assumes the risk that the mark may lose
its distinctive character and degenerate into a generic description. 2
Thus, as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in
American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.: "That is a peril
to which all such advertising [of a trademark] is subject; its very
success may prove its failure."'
discretion through the use of merely permissive language: "Provided, That the Federal Trade
Commission may apply to cancel on the grounds specified in subsections (c) and (e) of this
section. . . ... 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970) (emphasis supplied). One author commented that this
authority appeared superfluous because the FTC already had broad powers in the trademark
field granted by its enabling statute. O'Hara, The Federal Trade Commission's Power Over
Trademarks, 38 TRADEMARK RE. 613, 614 (1948).
24. See generally Ball, supra note 21, at 491. Importantly, the FTC does not ordinarily
exercise its powers if a private remedy is readily available. Stockell, The Federal Trade
Commission and Trademarks, 54 TRADMARK REP. 500 (1964).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
26. R. CALLMANN, supra note 8, § 74.2, at 232.
27. Id.
28. 208 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1953); see DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85
F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.,
299 U.S. 601 (1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); cf. Cummins
Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892 (C.C.P.A. 1966). In Cummins, the
appellant, Cummins Engine Company, complained that it had expended substantial finan-
cial resources in promoting its product in connection with the name TURBODIESEL. The
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the claim stating that
[Vol. 20:1
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Although arbitrary and fanciful names are considered to be marks
worthy of the greatest degree of legal protection, 9 even trademarks
embraced by this category may degenerate into generic designa-
tions0 as their distinctiveness fades with the lapse of time and con-
tinued public use.31 "Genericide," the metamorphosis of a distinc-
tive mark into a generic term, ordinarily results from several factors
which often are difficult to identify; concomitantly, the deteriora-
tion of the trademark may be equally difficult to abate.3 2 To some
extent the erosion of a mark's distinctiveness usually is attributable
to its owner. Thus, the Lanham Act provides that a mark is aban-
doned and unprotected "[w]hen any course of conduct of the regis-
trant, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the
mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin." 33 Among the
acts that may result in the loss of trademark protection are the
improper use of the mark by its owner, whether on the product itself
or in advertising the product; the failure of the owner to prevent
infringements and generic usage; and the failure of the owner to
educate the public as to the mark's significance as an indication of
source of manufacture 34 or to discourage the misuse of the mark as
"merchants act at their peril in attempting, by advertising, to convert common descriptive
names, which belong to the public, to their own exclusive use." Id. at 895 (quoting 132
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557 (T.T.A.B. 1962), on reconsideration, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 775 (T.T.A.B.
1964)).
29. See note 6 supra & accompanyng text.
30. E.g., Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Prods. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 747, 764 (N.D.
Ill. 1958) (although fanciful, "Riverbank", as applied to doors, may become generic).
31. 1 J. GLSON, supra note 9, § 2.01, at 2-7; cf. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)
("A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and
may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which
it is used.") Mr. Justice Holmes proffered this comment in Towne, which presented the issue
of whether the term "income" in the Income Tax Act of October 3, 1913 included stock
dividends within the meaning of that Act.
32. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02, at 2-9.
33. Lanham Act § 45, 14 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
34. See Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437 (D. Or. 1978). The
plaintiffs DICTAPHONE trademark was found to be a "strong mark" entitled to protection.
The district court noted that the mark had been long used, fought for, sought after, and made
stronger by being one of a family of marks. See also King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963), in which the appeals court commented on the
ineffectiveness of educational campaigns initiated by the plaintiff in an attempt to protect
THERMOS from devolving into a descriptive or generic word. Id. at 578. Additionally, the
court took notice of the company's failure to take such action soon enough. Id. at 579. See
also DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 6 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1934), modified,
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waxed Prods.
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a generic name for the product.35
Ultimately, the distinctiveness or genericness of a particular mark
must be determined by reference to its public image. 8 Judge
Learned Hand articulated this fundamental standard for assessing
the genericness of a mark: "What do the buyers understand by the
word for whose use the parties are contending." 37 This standard
presents factual, rather than legal, determinations involving evi-
dence ostensibly reflecting the subjective meaning the consuming
public ascribes to the mark." Recognized sources of evidence con-
cerning the accepted meaning of a mark include the testimony of
members of the purchasing public themselves; 39 dictionary entries
of the word in controversy;40 generic use of the mark in trade publi-
cations, newspapers, magazines, patents, and other publications of
the type relied upon by lexicographers;4 expert testimony by lingu-
Co., 299 U.S. 601 (1936). In DuPont Cellophane, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated that "[iut . .. makes no difference what efforts or money the DuPont Company
expended in order to persuade the public that 'cellophane' means an article of DuPont
manufacture. So far as it did not succeed in actually converting the world to its gospel it can
have no relief." 85 F.2d at 81.
35. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963);
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523, 524 n.47
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Digges, Is Your Advertising Destroying Your Trademark?, 35
TRADEMARK REP. 51, 55 (1945).
36. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02, at 2-11.
37. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In a cancellation
proceeding, the focus is on the public's understanding of the designation in determining
whether it is the common descriptive name for the product. Department of Justice v. Calspan
Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 147, 149 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[1],
at 2-12.
38. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.0211], at 2-13.
39. Id. § 2.02[2], at 2-14.
40. Id.; see, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (use of dictionary definition of "Lite" provided
one element supporting the court's conclusion that "Lite" was a common descriptive term
not subject to exclusive appropriation as a trademark and therefore not legally protectible);
Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (pri-
mary reliance on dictionary in ordering cancellation of TURBODIESEL trademark). See
generally Lunsford, Trademarks and Semantics: The Use and Misuse of Trademarks in
Dictionaries and Trade Journals, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 520 (1972); 6 GA. L. REv. 311 (1971).
41. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The court of appeals in Miller Brewing Co. noted
that:
Similar definitions and usage are found in reference works on chemical technol.
ogy, industry publications, and magazines and newspapers generally. Indeed,
state statutes even use "light beer" as a generic or common descriptive term.
"Light" is clearly a common descriptive word when used with beer.
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ists or other language experts;42 and consumer surveys, if they meet
the applicable evidentiary safeguards." The -degree to which the
trier of fact relies upon any one kind of evidence as opposed to
another may vary, as may the weight accorded the particular kinds
of evidence introduced. 44
The party asserting genericness, either as a ground for cancella-
tion45 or as a defense to a trademark infringement action,46 bears a
Id. at 81 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the appeals court recognized that the term "light"
was a'common descriptive term in other contexts and that Miller Brewing Company was
trying "to capitalize on the trend of 'consumer products going lighter all over the world, be
it foods, be it whiskeys, be it cigarettes."' Id. (quoting from the deposition of Miller's presi-
dent). See also Department of Justice v. Calspan Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 147, 149
(C.C.P.A. 1978). In Calspan Corp., the record indicated that virtually every public use of the
challenged mark FINDER referred to its owner as the source of the product and used the mark
correctly, i.e., the mark appeared entirely in upper case or with quotations around it. The
mark was not found to be the common descriptive name for the product.
42. Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,488-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 963, 970-71
(W.D. Pa. 1967), affl'd, 395 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968). Contra,
Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 205 (N.D. Ga. 1967); accord,
1 J. GnSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[2], at 2-19.
43. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 427 F. Supp. 1192, 1200-01 (W.D.
Wis.), re'd, 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 518-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); American
Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 20-22 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub
nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). See also
1 J. GmsoN, supra note 9, § 2.02[2], at 2-19 to 2-20; 3 R. CALMAAN, supra note 8, § 82.3(c),
at 855.
The admissibility of survey evidence has been a recurring issue in trademark litigation. See
Annot., 76 ,AL.R.2d 619 (1961). Judicial acceptance of public survey evidence in trademark
cases has been discussed in several cases. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing
Co., 264 F.2d 88, 93 (6th Cir. 1959); Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d
845, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970). Partisan surveys have numerous failings
and one author has suggested the possibility of conducting non-partisan surveys. Bernacchi,
Trademark Meaning and Non-Partisan Survey Research: A Marriage of Necessity, 30 AD. L.
REV. 447 (1978).
44. For example, in the LITE litigation the district court placed considerable weight on a
consumer survey introduced by Miller. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 427
F. Supp. 1192, 1200-01 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978). In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit discounted the survey
and placed emphasis on generic usage in dictionaries, trade journals, the use of "light" on
other products, and use in state statutes. 561 F.2d at 80-81.
45. Department of Justice v. Calspan Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 147, 151 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(burden is on petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence); W.D. Byron &
Sons v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d 1001, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1967). (petitioner bears a heavier
burden); Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 205, 208 (N.D. Ga.
1967).
46. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 510 (E.D.N.Y.
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considerable burden of proof regarding this issue. In balancing the
conflicting interests of the trademark owner, the party challenging
the mark, and the public, courts apparently favor the trademark
owner and are reluctant to hold that valuable trademark rights have
been lost.47 Some courts have been so reluctant to renounce the
protection previously accorded to a trademark that they have re-
quired the attacking party to demonstrate that "to the consuming
public as a whole, the term has lost all of its trademark signifi-
cance"48 and have protected a registered mark absent conclusive
evidence of its having become generic.49 Other courts, however, have
imposed a less burdensome standard, requiring only that a chal-
lenger show that the mark is significant to a majority of consumers
as a description of the product rather than as an indication of its
origin.5
The underlying rationale for imposing such a difficult burden is
the fundamental unfairness in penalizing a trademark owner for
marketing its brand-name product so successfully that the public
comes to associate the mark with the product itself rather than with
the producer.51 The economic irony in the use of a trademark in
1975) ("[W]here ... evaluation of all pertinent factors still leaves the matter in some doubt,
such doubt should be resolved against the newcomer.") (citations omitted).
47. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[1], at 2-11. In Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods.
Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962), the appellate court noted
that in order to declare a mark generic "the principal significance of the word must be its
indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than an indication of its origin." See
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577,
579 (2d Cir. 1963); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
48. See, e.g., Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955), aff'd, 237
F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957); B.V.D. Co. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 16 TADEMARK REP. 423, 425 (N.D. Ill. 1926) ("The fact that there are many who
suppose that 'B.V.D.' is the name of a type of underwear is of no importance except to show
the great value of plaintiff's trademark, and it does not authorize another dealer or manufac-
turer to benefit therefrom.").
49. E.g., Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 208 (N.D.
Ga. 1967). A district court judge of the Western District of Wisconsin noted that:
But I do conclude at least that Miller should not be held to have lost the legal
advantage it once held, unless there is a clear showing by hard evidence that
the word "light" as applied to beer is now widely understood by the public to
denote a beer with low-caloric content.
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 427 F. Supp. 1204, 1206-07 (W.D. Wis.),
rev'd, 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
50. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
51. See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 8, § 74.2, at 232-33.
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marketing a product is that the greater the success of the marketing
scheme, in which the use of the trademark has been instrumental,
the greater the opportunity for the mark to lose its distinctiveness
and therefore its protection. Consequently, some courts acknowl-
edge genericness as a tribute to the business' marketing skill and
view it as the "height of injustice" to impose upon the skillful busi-
ness a penalty by depriving it of the exclusive rights to the mark it
made so popular.52 In response to this problem, leading authorities
in the field of trademark law have argued in support of a standard
that approaches an almost irrebuttable presumption in favor of the
trademark. 3 At the least, this suggests that any attempt to remove
a mark's protection on the basis of its genericness should be viewed
with caution, lest a skillful business be deprived of the fruits of its
acumen.
THE EFFECTS OF GENERIC TRADEMARKS AND
THE BASIS FOR FTC ACTION
The rationale underlying the decision to declare a trademark
"generic," and thereby to deprive the owner of the right to its ex-
clusive use, is that once a trademark becomes generic it ceases to
perform the functions which originally justified its protection. In-
stead of identifying the product's manufacturer to the public, the
mark has come to be associated in the public mind with a class of
goods or services. 4 Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon of the Federal
Trade Commission has suggested that in certain cases generic
marks may operate to deceive consumers and restrain competition.55
Therefore, if a trademark has suffered genericide, its registration
should be cancelled to permit other businesses to use the mark in
52. H.A. Metz Laboratories, Inc. v. Blackman, 153 Misc. 171, 177, 275 N.Y.S. 407, 414
(1934) (the firm's success in marketing its product contain the seeds of destruction for its
trademark, the device that played a large part in the firm's success).
53. According to Rudolf Callmann:
Once the mark is introduced and the article to which it refers established, the
trademark owner assumes the risk that his distinctive word may degenerate into
a common word. "That is a peril to which all such advertising [of a trademark]
is subject; its very success may prove its failure." The courts should hold that
it has thus changed character only if there is conclusive evidence thereof and if
the particular circumstances make that metamorphosis probable. Otherwise,
the most valuable trademarks would soon become publicijuris.
3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 74.2, at 232 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
54. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-3.
55. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 5.
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order to promote competition and to protect consumers.
Commissioner Dixon argued that protecting a generic trademark
seriously impinges upon the ability of the consuming public to de-
cide rationally among an array of similar products. 5 When a for-
merly valid trademark has suffered genericide but the owner's mo-
nopoly on the word is maintained, consumers may be misled as to
the word's function. 57 As a result, a buyer may conclude erroneously
that the often higher priced, generically named product is of a dif-
ferent character than products which are essentially the same but
must be called by a different name.'5 Thus, Commissioner Dixon
concluded that consumer well-being actually is diminished when a
generic mark is improperly protected. 9 The improper protection of
a generic mark may result in four identifiable forms of injury to
competing businesses."0 First, a competing enterprise's share of a
particular market is likely to be less than it could be if the firm were
not prohibited from using the generic word. Second, competitors
may have to make substantial investments in advertising to pro-
mote their own trademarks in an attempt to overcome the competi-
tive barrier established by the generic mark. Third, small firms may
be forced out of the market if they cannot make the investment in
additional advertising and promotion necessary to surmount the
anticompetitive influence of the mark. Fourth, monopoly privileges
accorded to the common descriptive name for a product may dis-
courage potential competitors from entering that market.
Although Commissioner Dixon conceded that sometimes these
problems are redressed by existing private remedies,' he further
56. Id. at 6.
57. A clear example of this result was suggested by Commissioner Dixon in his speech
before the 100th Annual Meeting of the United States Trademark Association:
Consumer: "I'd like some aspirin, please."
Pharmacist: "That'll be 10 cents for a box of Bayer Aspirin, sir."
Consumer: "Well, I was sort of hoping to spend a little less." (This is 1920,
after all.)
Pharmacist: "Let's see now, we have some very find Brand X acetylsalicylic
acid in tablet form, for only 8 cents."
Consumer: "But I don't want any silly sally acid, I want aspirin."
Pharmacist: "Well, sir, it's really just about the same thing."
Consumer: "Then why isn't it called aspirin?"
Id. at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 8.
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argued that the incentives for competitors to challenge a generic
mark often may be outweighed by the costs involved. In these situa-
tions, Commissioner Dixon proposed that the FTC should exercise
its authority under section 14 of the Lanham Act to petition to
cancel generic marks, because the public may benefit from the can-
cellation of such a mark even though no single competitor has the
incentive to challenge it."2
Shortly after this admonition, in an unprecedented move,63 the
FTC filed a petition seeking to cancel or restrict Formica Corpora-
tion's trademark FORMICA, solely on the ground that it had be-
come a generic term for decorative plastic laminates. 4 Although
private remedies are available to Formica Corporation's competi-
tors, the FTC, concluding that the mark is generic, presumably
acted in the belief that none of Formica Corporation's competitors
had a sufficient incentive to challenge the mark and that competi-
tion was being impaired and consumers were being deceived. 5
62. Id.
63. This broad authority granted the FTC by § 14 of the Lanham Act to petition for the
cancellation of generic trademarks has been ignored almost entirely, perhaps because this
power is viewed as superfluous to the powers the Commission enjoys over trademark litigation
granted by the Federal Trade Commission Act. See O'Hara, supra note 23, at 614.
The FTC has filed only five cancellation petitions since the Lanham Act became effective
in 1947. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 9. Three of the five petitions sought cancellation
alleging trademark abandonment as defined in the Act. FTC v. Service Seed Co., Cancella.
tion Proceeding No. 7478 (filed May 2, 1960); FTC v. Danne, Cancellation Proceeding No,
7152 (filed Aug. 5, 1958); FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (1950). Two petitions
were filed to cancel fraudulently obtained marks. FTC v. Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd.,
289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961); FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (1950).
One author argues that the FTC has more appropriate and flexible ways of accomplishing
its purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition than to rely on § 14 of the Lanham
Act. Stockell, supra note 24, at 502-08.
64. FTC v. Formica Corp., 382 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-1 to A-3 (June 8, 1978).
65. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 10. In 1964, one commentator wrote that the FTC
is not likely to employ its authority under the Lanham Act except under the most unusual
circumstances, circumstances where it appears that the public is being injured in a direct
and demonstrable way and where cancellation will accomplish the desired result. Stockell,
supra note 24, at 509. In this regard it is interesting to' note that the president of Formica
Corporation contends that purchasers of plastic laminates are well aware that FORMICA is
one of many competing brands and that, while it has the largest individual market share,
more than 60% of all plastic laminates purchased and used in the United States are of other
brands. 382 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-2 (June 8, 1978). Among the competing
brands are Dart Industry's WILSON-ART, General Electric's TEXOLITE, and Westing-
house's MICARTA. Id.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: PRIVATE VERSUS
AGENCY INITIATED CHALLENGES
Incentives, Costs, and the Free Ride
Arguably, the FTC may protect competition and consumers more
effectively than may firms in the private sector because of the sub-
stantial resources available to the federal agency. For example, one
important advantage which the FTC would have over private firms
is its ability to conduct a single consumer survey with respect to
several different trademarks. 8 This would enable the FTC to obtain
important evidence at a cost considerably below that which a pri-
vate competitor would pay for a survey concerning one trademark
thought to be generic. Similarly, the Commission is not subject to
the same financial concerns regarding the high costs of litigation,
with the accompanying diversion of resources from research and
development, investments, or other profit making activities, which
confront a private business in challenging a trademark. Nor is the
FTC threatened by possible shareholder challenges to legal expendi-
tures of doubtful value. To this extent FTC action appears justifia-
ble inasmuch as it protects consumer and competitor interests in
the absence of sufficient incentives to warrant competitors to act on
their own behalf.6 7
However, while the resources available to the FTC for use in
challenging generic trademarks may be greater than those available
to private businesses, these resources are not unlimited. Because
businesses that own trademarks challenged by the FTC may be
expected to resist strongly any attempt to cancel those marks, the
cost to the agency may greatly outweigh the benefits achieved. This
loss will be magnified to the extent that needed funds are diverted
from the Commission's other activities.
One of the primary disincentives for invoking the private remedy
to liberate a generic mark is the "free ride" phenomenon. Though
the challenger must bear the entire cost of the suit himself, if he is
successful in challenging the mark, he must share the fruit of the
victory, the use of the generic word, among all of the registrant's
competitors.68 A competing firm, therefore, may decide not to chal-
66. Such surveys could be conducted under the FTC's broad investigatory powers. 15
U.S.C. § 46(a) (Supp. 1978).
67. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 8.
68. Id.
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lenge a generic mark because the valuable benefits, often gained at
considerable expense, will flow to other competitors who get a "free
ride" at the challenger's expense. Arguably, the FTC would be
watchful for situations in which competitors may lack incentive to
challenge the mark because of this "free ride" problem." In such
situations the Commission, through a successful cancellation pro-
ceeding, could overcome competitor inertia, minimize consumer
deception, and increase market information by allowing substan-
tially similar products to be called by their generic names.
This argument in favor of agency initiated cancellation proceed-
ings overly emphasizes the distincentive engendered by the costs of
a challenge and the "free-ride" problem. Trademarks are a vital
commercial tool in competitive markets in which many competing
brands seek to preempt a share of the market. Competing brands
often are advertised heavily,7" and statistics indicate that few if any
market positions remain impregnable as new brands seek the favor
of consumers or as existing brands are revitalized. 71 A trademark
does not entitle its owner to prohibit the use, manufacture, or sale
of any product. Any firm may market a similar product under a
different trademark, and comparative advertising techniques are
available to each of the competing firms.72 Although the entrench-
69. Id. at 12.
70. "Trademarks are intimately tied in with advertising since they provide the identifica-
tion of the advertised products." Backman, The Role of Trademarks in Our Competitive
Economy, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 219 (1968).
71. See generally id. at 219, 221-29. This article contains a number of statistics on trade-
marks, advertising, and changing market shares.
72. In early 1971, the National Broadcasting Company announced it would accept compar-
ative advertising which identifies competitors or competing products by name. NBC adopted
this new policy on a trial basis with the approval of the FTC. The American Broadcasting
Company and the Columbia Broadcasting System were then requested by the FTC to volun-
tarily adopt similar policies permitting advertisers to name competitors and competitive
products when making comparative product claims. FTC News Summary, No. 7-1972 (March
16-31, 1972); FTC News, No. 1-0320 (March 20, 1972). On the subject of comparative adver-
tising, see Symposium, Comparative Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 351 (1977).
Comparative advertising, by referring directly to a competing product's trademark, is a
relatively recent development in advertising strategy. The permissible boundaries of this
approach to consumer persuasion are not settled. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. John-
son & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affl'd, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133 (2d Cir.
1978) (the use in television and printed advertising of certain product superiority claims of
ANACIN over TYLENOL enjoined). See generally Note, The Law of Comparative Advertis-
ing: How Much Worse is "Better" than "Great'" 76 COLuM. L. REv: 80 (1976). Before 1971,
the broadcast networks refused to accept such advertising, and, as a result, advertisers were
required to 6ompare their products with an anonymous "Brand X" or "a leading brand." In
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ment of several firms promoting a class of products with well-
recognized trademarks may make a particular market difficult to
enter without burdensome advertising expenditures, the firms al-
ready in the market may incur equally heavy advertising costs to
maintain their respective market positions. Moreover, a new en-
trant may choose to advertise less and underprice existing firms by
relying on large retail chains to publicize the availability of new low-
priced substitutes. 3
In addition to these economic considerations, a new entrant or an
existing competitor may have an incentive to challenge an allegedly
generic mark because a successful challenge would allow the com-
petitor to take advantage of the trademark owner's advertising,
which created much of the public's original acceptance of and de-
mand for the product .7 Also, the entrant's advertising costs would
be limited to educating consumers to distinguish its own substituta-
ble brand of the product from those of the trademark owner's and
other competitors. The former owner, similarly, would have to de-
velop a scheme for differentiating its products from those of compet-
itors. The former owner of the mark also would have to incur heavy
advertising costs to maintain its relative share of the market as well
as absorb the cost of litigation. Although the costs to the competitor
of such a challenge would be high, the costs to the generic trademark
owner may be substantially greater..
Thus, the benefits gained by a competitor taking advantage of the
1972, when the FTC anounced that ABC and CBS had agreed for a one-year trial period to
accept comparative advertising that named competing products, the Commission was con-
cerned that previous restrictions might prevent the consumer from receiving information that
is relevant and useful in making an informed choice between competing products and in some
cases even mislead or deceive the consumer. FTC News Summary, No. 7-1972 (March 16-31,
1972); FTC News, No. 1-0320 (March 20, 1972). See generally Symposium, Comparative
Advertising, supra. The practice has become permanent, "with several networks adopting
comparative advertising guidelines and clearance procedures for commercials which name
competing products." 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 5.09[2], at 5-66 to 5-67.
73. R. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 228 (2d ed. 1977).
74. In Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 978 (2d Cir. 1948), Judge Augustus
Hand noted that "a 'free ride', without more, is in line with the theory of competition," and,
quoting from Justice Brandeis' opinion in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,
122 (1938), stated that "[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or
trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the
consuming public is deeply interested." 167 F.2d at 978.
This does not mean that a new entrant or competitor can ride on another's goodwill to the
extent of using his trademark, but it does mean that he can sell similar goods as his own and
take advantage of the "goodwill" for the product created by the existing firm(s).
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market created by the trademark owner's original advertising would
outweigh the costs of challenging the generic mark. Although the
benefits of a successful challenge of a generic trademark will be
shared by all competitors, these competitors still must incur sub-
stantial advertising costs to establish their brands.7 5 These advertis-
ing costs minimize the effects of the benefits-sharing problem and
disarm it as a significant disincentive to private challenges of the
generic name.
The benefits-sharing problem may be minimized through another
obvious procedure. Instead of one competitor bearing all the costs
of the challenge while having to share the reward with others, a joint
action challenging the generic mark could be brought by the com-
peting firms. By retaining common counsel, pooling investigative
resources, and sharing the other expenses of the action, the costs of
the challenge could be reduced considerably. As a consequence,
each competitor would not only share in the benefits but also would
bear some portion of the costs. This combined suit may result from
joining several individual actions, from initiating a class action, or
from permitting a trade association representing several competi-
tors to press the claim. 8 Whatever its procedural form, such a chal-
75. "In the field of free competition it is the aim of every producer to differentiate his goods;
indeed, competition cannot function without it. The achievement of it is the fruit of a free
economy." 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 112, 125 (1948).
76. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939) (class suit in which the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers, on behalf of its members, sued users of musical
compositions to enforce class members' rights under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e)
(1970)); Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245 (7th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944) (action initiated by the Furniture Manufacturers of
Grand Rapids located in Grand Rapids, Michigan, to restrain defendants from using the
name "Grand Rapids" in their advertising, alleging that the the defendants sought to benefit
from the confusion of consumers who bought furniture from the defendant's company, al-
though such furniture was not genuine "Grand Rapids furniture"); Key West Cigar Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Rosenbloom, 171 F. 296 (2d Cir. 1909) (several cigar manufacturers interested in
obtaining relief against defendant for unfair competition were entitled to join as complain-
ants); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(unfair competition action brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1970)); Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Gary Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
(trade association has standing to file an opposition brief to the registration of a trademark
that would weaken the sales position of its members). See also Denver Milk Bottle, Case &
Can Exchange, Inc. v. McKinzie, 879 Colo. 379, 287 P. 368 (1930) (an incorporated exchange
of milk dealers empowered to retrieve lost or stolen milk containers held to be authorized to
enjoin nonmember's use of bottles owned by members over nonmember defendant's objection
that only the individual members of the exchange could complain of unlawful retention); 4
R. CALLMANN, supra note 8, § 87.1(a)(1), at 18-21; § 98.8(c), at 775.
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lenge would serve the public interest and further competition with-
out undue agency interference.
The Costs of Trademark Protection
The FTC's renewed attention to generic trademarks and its deci-
sion to exercise its authority under section 14 of the Lanham Act
against generic marks77 is adverse to the public interest. Owners of
successful marks who are concerned about the possibility of an FTC
cancellation proceeding, as well as the owners of marks actually
challenged by the FTC, will have to incur additional costs in pro-
tecting and defending their marks, and these new costs will be
passed on to the public.
A trademark owner has a substantial financial interest in protect-
ing its mark and in keeping it from becoming generic. 8 These costs
increase as the owner's product becomes accepted and other firms
market similar, competing products. Among the measures a com-
pany might take to preserve the distinctiveness of its trademark are
the following: 7
1. The firm may use its trademark together with the generic or
descriptive name on the product and in advertisements.80
2. The consuming public must be informed that the trademark
is not the proper name by which to refer to the product in a generic
77. 371 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-5 (March 23, 1978) ("FTC sources have
indicated that several other trademarks [besides FORMICA] are also under scrutiny, but
that it would be 'premature' to assume that any cancellation petitions will be filed").
78. "Expenditures in protecting a company's trademark, to some degree, reflect the own-
ers' opinion of their worth. It has been said for example that the Coca-Cola Company spends
hundreds of thousands of dollars per year protecting its trademarks COCA-COLA and
COKE." Lunsford, supra note 5, at 81.
Generally, advertising accomplishes two important goals for the advertiser:
it identifies the advertiser or his product by trademark, tradename, spokesman,
music, packaging, "image" or a combination of elements so that the consumer
can recognize the product when he sees it in a store [and] it provides informa-
tion to the consumer about the desirable qualities of the product, its uses, its
appearance, its appeal, its cachet.
See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 5.0911], at 5-63.
79. See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 8, § 74.2, at 240-44; 1 J. GILSON, supra note
9, § 2.02[7]; Diamond, How to Use a Trademark Properly, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 431 (1971);
Digges, supra note 34, at 54-56; Mensor, Advertising Practices in Use of Trademarks, Includ-
ing Policing Thereof, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 708 (1952); Weigel, supra note 3; 17 VAND. L. REv.
620 (1964).
80. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[7], at 2-27. See Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods.
Corp., 306 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Dennis-
Mitchell Indus., 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116 (1955).
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sense." Educating the public to use the trademark properly may be
accomplished through routine advertising designed specifically for
this purpose. 2 In addition, some courts recognize the "family of
marks" doctrine 3 as an alternative method for indicating that the
trademark is not a proper generic name to use when referring to the
product but is merely a symbol which indicates the product's origin
through use on related products by the same manufacturer.4
3. The firm must not use or permit the use of its trademark in
possessive, plural, or verbal forms.85
4. The firm actively should seek to distinguish its trademark
81. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[7], at 2-7. Notably, a recent district court opinion
stated:
[A]lthough its fame and familiarity have led to some misuse of
"Dictaphone" by the general public, the descriptive terms "dictating machine,"
"dictation equipment" and the like are well known and used both by Dicta-
phone's competitors and by the buyers of dictation equipment. The availability
and widespread use of these descriptive terms proves that it is not necessary for
others to use "Dictaphone" to make buyers understand what is being sold.
Therefore, "Dictaphone" is not generic.
Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 447 (D. Or. 1978) (citations
omitted).
82. 1 J. GrLSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[7], at 2-28. For example, Xerox Corporation has
placed such advertisements in the American Bar Association Journal. One advertisement in
63 A.B.A.J. 1311 (1977) read:
The months of hacking through seemingly impenetrable jungles and scaling
tortuous ice-covered slopes had taken their toll. With the last vestige of his
strength, he dragged himself to the entrance of the mountain cave. Forcing his
torn and pain-wracked body the last few inches, he collapsed, exhausted at the
feet of the great guru. His quest was finally at an end. "Tell me, oh great master,
oh seer of visions never dreamed of by the pithy mind of ordinary man," he
croaked, through fever-parched lips. "Tell me the answer." "The answer, my
son," the great guru whispered, "is that Xerox is a registered trademark of
Xerox Corporation and, as a brand name, should be used only to identify its
products and services."
83. Under the "family of marks" doctrine, an enterprise that owns a series of marks which
share a common prefix or suffix may prevent another party from using that prefix or suffix
to identify his products. The party claiming to have such a "family of marks" must prove
that consumers understand that mark to designate the assorted products of the claimant, that
is, that the relevant component has taken on a "secondary meaning" denoting the common
origin of the claimant's merchandise and that its use by another will lead to confusion. See
Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437 (D. Or. 1978); 1 J. GILSON,
supra note 9, § 5.03, at 5-23; E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAw AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1968).
84. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[7], at 2-28; see Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp.,
199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 441-42 (D. Or. 1978) (In holding that DICTAPHONE was not
generic, the court noted that the "family of marks" doctrine applied because the same
"Dicta" or "Dict" prefix had been used on assorted accessories and supplies.).
85. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[7], at 2-27.
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from the text of an advertisement to indicate to the public the legal
status of the mark as a trademark."6
5. The firm must object to the use of the mark as a generic term
in dictionaries, essays, scientific articles, trade journals, and by the
Patent and Trademark Office.87
6. By timely objection and proper procedure, the firm must act
affirmatively to prevent misuse of the trademark by others.8 Gener-
ally, a trademark owner's constant vigilance for offending uses fo-
cuses primarily upon the Patent and Trademark Office, where a
complaint may be lodged against the registration of a similar mark
or a mark using any part of the owner's trademark in a descriptive
manner. 9 If the allegedly similar mark is registered, the trademark
owner who sought the prohibition may have to initiate an infringe-
86. Id. at 2-28.
87. Although reference to a trademark in such "publications is not conclusive proof of its
generic nature," 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 8, § 74.2 at 241-42, courts generally regard this
evidence as an important factor to consider before making a determination of the issue. Id.;
see 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.02[2], at 2-15 to 2-19.
88. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 9, § 2.0217], at 2-29; see Bristol-Myers Co. v. Ritt, Macy &
Co., 151 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In Coca-Cola Co. v. Condado Pizza, Inc., 315 PAT.,
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-15 (D.P.R. 1977), the District Court for Puerto Rico issued a
permanent injunction barring the substitution of another cola-flavored beverage when res-
taurant customers called for "Coke" or "Coca-Cola." Judge Torruella concluded that the
defendant's failure to disclose the substitution of a cola beverage for "Coke" amounted to
unfair competition and trademark infringement of the COCA-COLA mark. Similarly, in
Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 387 PAT., T.M. & CoPviGHW J. (BNA) A-
16 (2d Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to disturb a preliminary
injunction prohibiting McGraw-Hill from publishing a book entitled the "Complete Scrabble
Dictionary" on the ground that if the book were published, Selchow & Righter's SCRABBLE
trademark for a word game would lose its distinctiveness and might be rendered generic.
89. In Frigidaire Corp. v. Nitterhouse Bros., 63 F.2d 123 (C.C.P.A. 1933), Frigidaire Corpo-
ration sought to appeal a ruling by the Commissioner of Patents. In the proceeding before
the Commissioner, Frigidaire Corporation, owner of the FRIGIDAIRE trademark, sought to
attack the proposed registration of "Frigidized Fish" as a competing mark. The Commis-
sioner held that "the proposed mark 'Frigidized Fish,' was and is descriptive, and was not
entitled to registration." Id. at 123. Additionally, the Commissioner held that because "the
goods produced by the appellant [Frigidaire Corporation], and those of the appellee
[Nitterhouse Brothers] . . . were not goods of the same descriptive properties . . . the
appellant could not, under the law, oppose the registration of the same." Id. The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals dismissed the appeal, stating that the question of whether the
appellant should have been adjudged competent to challenge the proposed registration was
rendered moot because the registration was denied. Id. More recently, in Exxon Corp. v.
National Foodline Corp., 579 F.2d 1244 (C.C.P.A. 1978), the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of Exxon
Corporation's petition opposing the registration of EXXELLO for an ice cream-making ma-
chine.
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ment suit. In short, an aggressive policing program should be imple-
mented to challenge infringers and to contest registrations of con-
fusingly similar marks.
When confronted with the issue of whether an existing trademark
is entitled to continued legal protection, various courts have recog-
nized the owner's action or inaction in protecting the mark as a
critical, if not decisive, factor.2 0 These protective measures, though,
normally do not stimulate demand for the firm's brand-name prod-
uct,9' and, therefore, because the costs of protecting the trademark
cannot be offset entirely by increased sales,92 some part of these
costs is likely to be passed on to the consumer through higher prices.
The presence of the FTC as a potential challenger to a firm's
trademark would increase the costs of trademark protection even
further. The possibility that the FTC might view a particular trade-
mark as generic and therefore initiate cancellation proceedings
would cause a firm to be more vigilant in its efforts to control the
use of its trademark in its own advertising and to litigate more
avidly claims against others who misuse the mark. Presumably,
these increased protection costs would be incurred by all firms with
successful trademarks and then would be passed on to consumers.
90. See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 8, § 74.2, at 240.
91. Advertising that scrupulously avoids generic use of a trademark may be less successful
in increasing demand for the trademark owner's product than generic advertising because the
former is intended to keep the public from asking for, or referring to, a particular kind of
product by a firm's trademark for that product. For instance, assume that Levi-Strauss &
Company, a leading manufacturer of jeans, advertises in such a manner, carefully avoiding
any generic use of its LEVIS trademark to prevent its mark from becoming descriptive of
jeans. If its advertising is "successful" so that LEVIS does not become the generic word for
jeans, then consumers, instead of shopping for levis, will shop for jeans or denim slacks.
LEVIS jeans might be purchased instead of competitors' jeans because of their reputation
for quality or their lower price, not because many consumers would think that all jeans are
levis. As a consequence, competitors of Levi-Strauss & Company will be more competitive
than they would be if consumers shopped for levis instead of jeans. Otherwise, due to Levi-
Strauss' advertising, many consumers seeking the same product might purchase only Levi-
Strauss & Company's jeans, believing that jeans and levis were different products.
92. An argument can be made to the contrary. If these protective maneuvers are successful,
the trademark remains distinctive, and the product continues to be in demand; then perhaps
these protection costs may lead to higher sales and increased profits over the long run. A firm
may be able to prevent its competitors from using its mark generically and maintain demand
for the product over the years by diligently protecting its mark and vigorously marketing its
product. Hopefully, its protective measures will prevent the consuming public from associat-
ing its trademark with the description of its product. Thus, through protection of its trade-
mark and vigorous marketing, a firm might be able to maintain its market share for a longer
period of time than if it had not engaged in the protective measures.
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Thus, protecting against the threat that the FTC will challenge the
mark pursuant to its authority under section 14 of the Lanham Act
will result in even higher consumer prices; ultimately, the consumer
will pay the costs of safeguarding commerce against merely specula-
tive unfair practices.
The Decision to Petition to Cancel
Because of the very real possibility that the cancellation of a
firm's trademark may destroy the business that relies upon it, no
registration should be cancelled without careful study of all the
facts. 3 Even if he is successful on the merits, the owner of an at-
tacked trademark will have to bear the cost of defending his mark,
costs which would not have been incurred but for the FTC's ill-
advised decision to petition for cancellation. Thus, the FTC must
exercise great caution before deciding to petition to cancel a firm's
mark, for trademark owners will suffer egregious economic harm
unnecessarily if the FTC applies for the cancellation of a mark
which proves not to be generic.
If a firm decides to pass this cost on to consumers in the form of
higher prices, consumers may have to decide whether to pay the
increased price or to purchase a less expensive product manufac-
tured by a competitor. Consequently, the trademark owner risks a
reduction in his market share through lower sales, and consumers
are affected adversely to the extent that they may have to pay a
higher price for the product bearing the firm's trademark or pur-
chase a substitute product of potentially lower quality.
Unfortunately for trademark owners and consumers, the FTC has
little incentive to proceed carefully in deciding to file a cancellation
93. In a cancellation proceeding, valuable economic rights are involved upon which a
business may be greatly dependent. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933); W.
D. Byron & Sons v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d 1001, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1967). See also In re
Meyers, 201 F.2d 379, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
In determining whether to bring a cancellation proceeding against a trademark, the FTC
undoubtedly will rely heavily on the opinions of its staff members. Among the factors they
might consider are the firm's efforts over the years in protecting its mark through threats of
law suits, actual trademark litigation, and campaigns to educate sellers and consumers about
its trademark's significance as an indication of the product's source and not as a descriptive
name for the product itself. The FTC could look for generic usage of the mark in trade
journals, popular literature, and dictionaries as the basis for commencing its action. It could
conduct consumer surveys to determine whether or not the mark is used generically, or it
could conduct surveys among the trademark owner's competitors to find out why the mark
has not been challenged. See notes 79-89 supra & accompanying text.
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petition. Unlike a private firm, the time and expense of prosecuting
a cancellation proceeding will not compel the FTC to proceed with
caution. Nor is the FTC answerable to stockholders for the high
costs incurred in an unsuccessful challenge. Without these concerns
the Commission is likely to act more precipitously than a private
firm in deciding to challenge an allegedly generic trademark.
Restrictions on Trademark Use and Quality Differences
Ironically, the increased emphasis by the FTC on agency-
initiated cancellation suits may enhance rather than reduce con-
sumer deception. Trademarks promote the public interest by pro-
viding a method of product identification upon ,which a consumer
may rely in making an informed choice and by enhancing competi-
tion by offering manufacturers an incentive to produce higher qual-
ity products than their competitors. 4 If protection is no longer af-
forded the trademark of a manufacturer who produces merchandise
genuinely superior to that of his competitors, a trademark owner's
competitors are able to pass off inferior.products as being of equal
quality to those of the trademark owner.
Although admitting that this danger exists if the holder of the
generic mark in fact makes a better product, Commissioner Dixon
argued that the holder is not deprived necessarily of all rights in the
mark. 5 He may continue to use the trademark as the designation
of the source of his product even after other companies are allowed
to use the mark, in its generic sense, to describe their products."
This right is recognized by the courts, who are aware of their power
not only to declare a trademark generic in its entirety but also to
adjudge the mark only partially generic97 and to provide for the
94. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968). One of the objects of the FTC's
renewed attention to generic trademarks is to enable the public to become aware that various
brands of certain products are substantially identical, thereby aiding them in making in-
formed choices. Consumer awareness will engender meaningful competition if consumers
refuse to pay an unjustified price for the generic trademark owner's product once competitors
are free to refer to their products by the generic name, often the descriptive name most
familiar to the consumer.
95. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 12.
96. Id. Restrictions may be imposed as to the mode or place of use, or as to the goods and
services in connection with which use is sought. See generally D. RoB.RT, Ti NEW TRADE.-
MARK MANUAL 82 (1947).
97. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 12. Commissioner Dixon referred to the decree that
resulted from litigation over the THERMOS trademark. In American Thermos Prods. Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 14-15 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley
/ --' 5 TT':t T T/'1 rr t'r'J 4 lr 't'3 It A" A T TF d t
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concurrent use of the mark. Consequently, although a competitor is
permitted to use the mark, the courts have fasioned restrictive de-
crees prohibiting competitors from using the mark unless the condi-
tions set forth in the decree are met.
Moreover, section 37 of the Lanham Act confers statutory author-
ity upon the courts to issue concurrent-use decrees." Section 18 of
the Act provides that the TTAB has the authority to impose restric-
tions as part of the cancellation proceeding." The exercise of this
power, however, has not gone unchallenged. For example, in
Selfway, Inc. v. Traveler's Petroleum, Inc.,'10 the Court of Custom
and Patent Appeals upheld the TTAB's decision that a concurrent-
use determination cannot be made in a cancellation proceeding.
Although the court recognized that its all-or-nothing approach may
work hardships, "the majority [found] no statutory basis for per-
mitting restriction of a registration in lieu of cancellation."' In this
divided decision, the dissenters accused the majority of interpreting
section 18 in a manner contrary to previous interpretations and in
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963), instead of cancelling the
mark, the district court imposed several restrictions on the competitor's use of the mark.
Essentially, the defendant was allowed to use the mark to describe the character of its
product, while the trademark owner continued to use the mark as an indication of origin. For
example, Aladdin had to precede the use of the word "thermos" by the possessive of the name
"Aladdin," to confine its use of the word "thermos" to the lower case and to refrain from
advertisements that used the words "genuine" or "original."
98. Section 37 of the Lanham Act provides that, "in any action involving a registered mark
the court may . . .order the cancellation of registrations, in whole or in part .... and
otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action." 15
U.S.C. § 1119 (1970).
99. Section 18 of the Lanham Act provides that in cancellation proceedings the Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks "may cancel or restrict the registration of a registered
mark, . . . as the rights of the parties ... may be established in the [cancellation] proceed-
ing." 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
100. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271 (C.C.P.A. 1978). In Selfway, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals noted that:
The provision for cancellation proceedings in § 14 [of the Lanham Act] speaks
only of complete cancellation, and it is reasonable to presume that the power
to cancel granted in § 18 was intended to be exercised in a § 14 proceeding.
Similarly, the only ways a registration can be "restricted" are by placing limita-
tions on the description of the goods, the channels of trade, or the areas of use.
We find this functional definition of the term "restrict" used in the § 2(d)
proviso in reference to concurrent use proceedings, and it is reasonable to pre-
sume that the power to restrict granted in § 18 was intended to be exercised in
§ 2(d) concurrent use proceeding.
Id. at 276.
101. Id. at 277.
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fundamental conflict with the basic purposes of the Lanham Act. ' 2
If, under Selfway, the TTAB is unable to restrict the use of a mark
in lieu of complete cancellation, the Commissioners suggested com-
promise of concurrent-use decrees would be impossible in the con-
text of a section 14 cancellation proceeding instituted by the FTC.
Absent a less drastic alternative, the TTAB's cancellation of a mark
attacked unnecessarily by the FTC could result in increased con-
sumer deception if competitors of the owner are thereby enabled to
pass off inferior goods as equal in quality to those of the owner.
Even assuming arguendo that the TTAB has the authority to
restrict rather than cancel an allegedly generic mark, substantial
expense will be incurred in adjusting the rights :of competing par-
ties, as the history of the THERMOS-brand thermos bottle litiga-
tion illustrates. In American Thermos Products Co. v. Aladdin In-
dustries, Inc.,'°" the plaintiff sued to prevent Aladdin from using the
word "thermos" to describe its vacuum bottle containers. The dis-
trict court held that the term was generic but fashioned a decree
limiting the defendant's use of the word. This decree was affirmed
by the Second Circuit. '"4 Five years later,:Aladdin moved to modify
the original decree, arguing that King-Seeley's rights in the THER-
MOS trademark had deteriorated further."5 The district court de-
nied the motion to modify; however, Aladdin appealed to the Sec-
ond Circuit, which vacated the order and remanded the case.' 6 On
remand, the district court modified the 'original decree to permit
much freer use of the term "thermos" by Aladdin. °7 There is no
reason to believe that such difficulties and expenses will be avoided
merely because the FTC, rather than a private firm, initiates the
litigation attacking a mark as generic.
Moreover, proper restrictions can be imposed on the use of a mark
only if the competing firms are parties to the cancellation proceed-
ings, not when the only parties to the proceeding are the FTC and
the owner of the allegedly generic trademark. Assume, for instance,
102. Id. at 277-80.
103. 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley'Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
104. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
105. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 155 (D. Conn. 1969).
106. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
107. King-Seeley Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Conn.
1970). See generally Treece & Stephenson, A Look at American Trademark Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
547, 559-60 (1975).
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that Formica Corporation concedes that its FORMICA trademark
has become the generic name for decorative plastic laminates but
asserts that the quality of its product is superior to that of competi-
tors'. Accordingly, Formica Corporation argues that it should be
able to continue to use the mark to designate the source of its prod-
uct while allowing competitors to use the word only to describe the
nature of their products. At this point the FTC faces a dilemma. To
allow Formica Corporation greater rights in the use of the mark
there must be a finding that its plastic laminates are qualitatively
distinct from those of its competitors. But the FTC probably lacks
the expertise in product design and testing to determine adequately
whether such a distinction exists. Just this sort of evidence may be
available, however, if the suit were brought by Formica's competi-
tors. Nor could the FTC simply concede Formica's claim of superi-
ority without further testing. To do so would be to perpetuate a
misleading distinction if in fact Formica's product was indistin-
guishable from its competitors'. But, on the other hand, if Formica's
product is indeed superior, a failure to allow Formica to distinguish
its product may result in consumer deception by allowing competi-
tors to pass off their inferior goods as equal to Formica's product.
Thus, although the FTC would be litigating on behalf of the pub-
lic welfare-to minimize consumer deception regarding the source
or quality of products-this policy cannot be promoted successfully
unless the competitors' interests in the generic mark and in the
quality of their own products are represented fully. The FTC cannot
vindicate these competitor interests. The result is clear: although
the economic benefits to be gained by the competitors would not
justify the costs of challenging a generic trademark by individual
private action, these same costs will be incurred involuntarily as the
competitors are drawn into the FTC-initiated litigation to protect
their interests and to supply the needed evidence. These needless
costs, without the counterbalancing benefits, will be passed along
to the consumer. The FTC's involvement becomes superfluous inso-
far as it does not save the expense of competitor involvement; it
becomes unjustifiable to the extent that it results in costly litigation
without adequate certainty of savings or other benefits to consum-
ers.
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GENERIC TRADEMARKS AND THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act'°5 declares unlaw-
ful any unfair methods of competition and any unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce and authorizes the FTC to prevent
their use."0 9 Exercising this power, the FTC has prohibited the use
of deceptive trademarks.110 Moreover, the FTC has urged that con-
tinued, exclusive use of a trademark which is "virtually generic"
and has so dominated the market for a particular product as to deter
competition and to create a significant barrier to entry, is an unfair
trade practice in violation of section 5."' Arguing in favor of cancel-
lation proceedings under section 14 of the Lanham Act, Commis-
sioner Dixon has urged that precisely these undesirable effects re-
sult from the continued protection of trademarks which have be-
come generic. 1 2 Apparently, therefore, if generic trademarks ac-
tually are deceptive or confer an unfair competitive advantage, the
FTC may choose either to seek the cancellation of the mark's regis-
tration under the Lanham Act or to proceed against the owner of
the mark under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The Supreme Court long has recognized that trade names and
trademarks "constitute valuable business assets in the nature of
good will, the destruction of which probably would be highly inju-
108. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
109. Id. § 45(a)(6).
110. See, e.g., Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
883 (1960); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); Marietta
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 50 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1931).
111. In In re Borden Inc., No. 8978, reprinted in 406 PAT., T.M. & COPYRonT J. (BNA) D-
1 (Nov. 30, 1978), the FTC's complaint alleged, inter alia, that Borden had violated § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act by maintaining "monopoly power and a noncompetitive
market structure in the distribution and sale of reconstituted lemon juice ... [by] erecting
entry barriers through extensive trademark promotion and advertising which has artificially
differentiated "ReaLemon" from comparable competitive products. . . ." Complaint, In re
Borden, Inc., [1973-76 FTC Complaints & Orders] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,651. The
Commission found that Borden possessed a dominant share of the reconstituted lemon juice
market, which it unlawfully maintained by geographic price discrimination. This price dis-
crimination was effected in part through the exploitation of its dominant trademark, REALE-
MON, a mark which the Commission characterized as "virtually synonomous with processed
lemon juice. . . " 406 PAT., T.M. & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) at D-5. Similarly, the administra-
tive law judge, Judge Hanscom, found that REALEMON was "virtually the generic name
for bottled lemon juice and commands a premium price." In re Borden, Inc., [1973-76 FTC
Complaints & Orders] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,194.
112. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20, at 7.
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rious and should not be ordered if less drastic means will accomplish
the same result.' '13 Moreover, other courts have suggested that the
use of a trade name or trademark in advertising is a form of commer-
cial speech protected by the first amendment.' Any prior restraint
on such speech is inherently suspect."' Thus, any action by the FTC
which has the effect of depriving a trademark owner of the use and
control of his mark may raise issues of constitutional dimensions,
requiring a showing of actual harm to consumers or competitors
which outweighs the impact on the owner's rights of speech and
property. At a minimum, the remedy imposed by the FTC must be
limited to that which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the
agency's legitimate purpose.
If the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Lanham Act over-
lap in the protections they afford business and consumers against
the evils of generic trademarks, the remedies provided by the Acts
differ importantly. Section 14 of the Lanham Act provides a single
remedy: the cancellation of the mark's registration."' The resulting
destruction of the mark as the exclusive property of the owner
should be resorted to only if no less drastic means are available to
protect against the alleged harm."7 Thus, the remedy available
113. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933); accord, Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC,
327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946).
114. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977). See also Address by Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, 99th Annual Meeting of the
United States Trademark Assoc., reported in 330 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-10 to
A-12 (May 26, 1977).
115. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963);
Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
116. See note 19 supra.
117. In In re Borden, No. 8978, reprinted in 406 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIHT J. (BNA) D-1
(Nov. 30, 1978) (opinion of the Commission), the administrative law judge's order included
a requirement that, for a period of 10 years, Borden grant a license to any person or business
entity to use the name REALEMON and the REALEMON label design on containers of
reconstituted lemon juice. The licensees were required to disclose the identity of the manufac-
turer or distributor on such labels, to meet reasonable quality control standards to assure that
lemon juice produced and sold by the licensee under the REALEMON label was equal in
quality to Bordens, and to pay to Borden a limited royalty for use of the label. In re Borden,
Inc., [1973-76 FTC Complaints & Orders] TRADE REG. REP (CCH) 21,194.
The majority of the Commission, however, reversed this portion of Judge Hanscom's order:
While an order requiring licensing or suspension of a trademark may be ordered
as a means of dissipating illegally used or acquired monopoly power, we are
mindful that the remedy is a severe one, and should be imposed only where less
drastic means appear unlikely to suffice. ...
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under the Lanham Act will be inappropriate in all but the most
egregious cases of actual deception or unfairness.
In contrast with the limited remedy available to the FTC under
the Lanham Act, the Commission's power to shape appropriate
remedies under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
"ample to deal with the evil at hand."1 18 This power is not limited
to the simple cease and desist order u1 9 but rather resembles "the
authority of courts to frame injunctive decrees ... .120 Therefore,
in responding to deceptive or unfair effects of a trademark which
allegedly has become generic, section 5 empowers the FTC to shape
a narrow remedy, protecting both the trademark owner's speech and
property rights and the public interest in maintaining fair, undecep-
tive business practices. 21
The alternative remedies available to the FTC under section 5 to
combat the harmful effects of an allegedly generic trademark in-
clude:
(1) restrictions on the use of a trademark; for example, the owner
may be ordered to use the trademark in connection with only a
406 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) at D-10. Thus, although the Commission recognized
that the evils connected with a "virtually generic" trademark may be remedied appropriately
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, it also recognized that the imposition of any
remedy that deprives the trademark owner of the exclusive use and control of his mark is
"severe" and should be resorted to only if no less drastic remedy is available.
In Borden, the Commission's attention was focused upon the defendant's unfair monopoly
practices, caused in part by the active abuse of a dominant and "virtually generic" trade-
mark. These anticompetitive actions, and not the status of the defendant's trademark, were
condemned. Despite the nearly generic nature of that mark and the clear evidence of actual
abuse and resulting harm, the Commission refused to interfere with the defendant's right to
the exclusive use of that mark. Clearly inconsistent with this position is the FTC's decision
to seek the cancellation of allegedly generic trademarks under § 14 of the Lanham Act. The
focus in a proceeding under that Act is upon the status of the trademark as a common
descriptive term, not on its actual anticompetitive effects or upon the owner's actions. As a
result of a finding of genericness, a penalty at least as severe as that eschewed in Borden is
imposed irregardless of whether actual anticompetitive effects exist or can be shown. Clearly,
if Borden may be permitted to retain exclusive control of its trademark despite demonstrable
injury and abuse, it is inconsistent to deprive another owner of his mark merely because his
otherwise commendable industry has resulted in his mark's status as a household word.
118. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 311-12 & 312 n.17
(1963) (discussing the powers of the CAB under a similar statute); FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359
U.S. 392 (1959); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749,756 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978); ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 220 (2d Cir. 1976).
119. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d at 757.
120. Id. (citing Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 311-12
(1963)).
121. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946).
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certain percentage of his annual sales of the particular product,' 22
or he may be prohibited from using the mark in any advertising for
a designated period of time;re
(2) corrective advertising;'"2 for example, requiring the owner to
stress that his product is but one of several similar products avail-
able;
(3) compulsory licensure of the trademark to competitors;' 21
(4) prohibiting the use of the mark by the owner as a designation
of the source of the product, allowing its use only as a generic de-
scription of the product;
(5) prohibiting the owner from instituting infringement suits
against competitors who use the mark as a descriptive term;' 6 and
(6) dedication of the mark to the public. 127
Other remedies may be shaped by the FTC to accommodate the
peculiar circumstances of each case. In addition to these less oner-
ous remedies, the FTC is required to meet a concomitantly lighter
burden of proof under section 5. The FTC need not show actual
deception but only a "likelihood or propensity of deception
.... "12 Thus, unlike section 14, section 5 allows the FTC to reach
not merely egregious cases but also those cases involving a lesser
degree of harm. Section 5, therefore, makes available to the FTC the
122. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 858 (D.N.J. 1953)
(Sherman Act case).
123. For example, in his separate opinion in In re Borden, Inc., No. 8978, reprinted in 406
PAT., T.M. & COPRUOHT J. (BNA) D-1 (Nov. 30, 1978), Chairman Pertschuk suggested that
the FTC could remedy the anticompetitive effect of Borden's "virtually generic" trademark,
REALEMON, by enjoining the use of the mark for a fixed period. Id. at D-11.
124. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978).
125. This remedy, ordered by the administrative law judge in Borden, see note 10 supra,
has been the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Dobbs, Compulsory Trademark Licen-
sure as a Remedy for Monopolization, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 589 (1977); Palladino, Compulsory
Licensing of a Trademark, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 457 (1977); Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest:
Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977).
126. See United States v. Gamewell Co., [1948-49] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,236 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (Sherman Act antitrust case); United States v. Electric Storage Battery Co., [1946-
47] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 57,645 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (Sherman Act antitrust case).
127. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., [1954] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 67,827 (D.R.I.
1954); United States v. A.B. Dick Co., [1948-49] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,233 (N.D. Ohio
1948).
128. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933); accord, FTC v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.
1944).
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remedial and procedural' 2 flexibility necessary to meet the Su-
preme Court's mandate that "orders. . .go no further than is rea-
sonably necessary to correct the evil and preserve the rights of com-
petitors and [the] public"'' 3 and to preserve the interests of the
trademark owner protected by the first amendment.
Additionally, in a proceeding against allegedly generic trade-
marks under section 5, the procedural and evidentiary focus is upon
the deceptive or unfair competitive effect of the mark. In contrast,
in an action brought under section 14 of the Lanham Act, the issue
is whether the mark is generic; the important issue of whether con-
tinued use of the mark is unfair or deceptive need never be reached.
Under section 5, this issue is addressed directly and may be deter-
mined without importing evidence concerning the superfluous ques-
tion of genericness.
Thus, to the extent that the issue of genericness is not litigated
adequately by private parties, whether because of cost disincentives
or otherwise, the FTC should limit its investigation to the issues
that purportedly underlie the problem of genericness: deception and
competitive unfairness. Precisely this focus is afforded by section 5.
Moreover, section 5 permits the FTC to design a remedy narrowly,
affecting the trademark owner's property and speech rights no more
than absolutely necessary to prevent the feared harm. The lack of
similar flexibility under section 14 of the Lanham Act makes the
FTC's decision to seek a remedy under that section indefensible.
CONCLUSION
Under section 14 of the Lanham Act the Federal Trade Commis-
129. Importantly, the FTC does not enjoy any procedural advantages in prosecuting a
cancellation proceeding under § 14 of the Lanham Act that would enable it to protect compe-
tition and consumers more effectively than a suit brought by a competing firm. The Commis-
sion is required to file and to prosecute its petition before the TTAB, the same forum in which
the competitor must file. Lanham Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1970); 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.111 to
2.113 (1977). Similarly, the Commission is bound by the same procedural rules that control
a private suit, usually the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise provided in the
Code of Federal Regulations. 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116 to 2.128 (1977). The Commission also is
subject to substantially the same burden of proof as the private litigant in attempting to
demonstrate to the TTAB that a particular mark should be cancelled. See notes 46-53 supra
& accompanying text.
130. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d
611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Resort Car Rental Systems v. FTC,
518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967).
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sion may seek to cancel' 3' a registered trademark on the ground that
the mark has become generic.' 32 Although the FTC has been so
empowered since the Lanham Act became effective in 1947,133 no
petition to cancel solely on the ground of genericness had been filed
until May 31, 1978, when the FTC sought to cancel Formica Corpo-
ration's FORMICA mark.'34 From all indications, petitions to cancel
other allegedly generic trademarks will be filed by the FTC in the
near future.'35
The FTC's renewed attention to its cancellation powers under the
Lanham Act is an unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion by a
governmental agency into the marketplace. Adequate remedies are
readily available to private, competing businesses if a generic mark
is distorting consumer preferences. Moreover, the shift in FTC pol-
icy is inappropriate because it may result in higher prices for many
consumer products, seriously damage successful businesses, and
cause consumers to be deceived about qualitative differences be-
tween competing products.
Normally, consumer interests and competition would be served
better if the FTC abstained from initiating generic trademark litiga-
tion and permitted market forces to determine whether a mark
should be challenged as generic by an injured competitor. Action by
the FTC may be appropriate; however, in those limited instances
in which the continued use of a generic mark clearly is harmful to
the welfare of consumers and to free enterprise. In such instances,
the FTC should act within its authority under section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act to prevent unfair or deceptive business
practices. Unlike section 14 of the Lanham Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act clearly provides the Commission with the proce-
dural and remedial flexibility necessary to resolve the delicate issues
implicated by any challenge to the validity of a trademark.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
132. Id. § 1064(c).
133. Section 46(a) of the Lanham Act provided that the law would take effect one year from
July 5, 1946. Historical Note-Effective Date, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127 (1970).
134. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
135. This conclusion is based on Commissioner Dixon's statements that the FTC currently
is devoting renewed attention to this area and that the Commission is looking at the question
of generic trademarks in the belief that in certain cases the use of such marks can be harmful
to the welfare of consumers and the free enterprise system. Dixon, Remarks, supra note 20,
at 12-13. See also 371 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-5 (March 23, 1978).
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